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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3964 
___________ 
 
In re:  JOHN L. BEEGHLEY & LAURA L. BEEGHLEY, 
         Debtors 
 
BARBARA J. BEEGHLEY, 
      Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Nos. 2-98-cv-05527 & 2-15-cv-04343) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
August 14, 2017 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 20, 2018) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Barbara Beeghley, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying her motion to vacate an  
order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
issued on April 29, 2015, and an order denying her motion for reconsideration of that 
order.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1 
 Barbara Beeghley and John Beeghley were divorced in 1993.  On November 7, 
1995, the Delaware Family Court issued an interlocutory order addressing matters related 
to the divorce.  The Family Court ruled that Mr. Beeghley’s retirement funds should be 
divided, and that counsel was expected to timely prepare Qualified Domestic Relations 
Orders (“QDROs”) for the Court to act upon.  The order reflects that the divorce 
proceedings were contentious and that there was extensive litigation.  Ms. Beeghley had 
counsel.  The Court also allowed Ms. Beeghley to file memoranda after a dispute arose 
with her lawyer, but stated that she abused the judicial process by papering the Court with 
pleadings and limited her filings.  There were apparently subsequent proceedings 
regarding the QDROs, which are required for the distribution of retirement funds to Ms. 
Beeghley, but these orders were never prepared. 
 Mr. Beeghley remarried and he and his wife filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
in 1997.  Ms. Beeghley filed numerous motions and documents in the bankruptcy case, 
including a proof of claim, objections to the confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, motions 
for contempt, and motions to dismiss the case.  The Bankruptcy Court allowed Ms. 
                                              
1Ms. Beeghley’s notice of appeal of the April 29, 2015 order was docketed in District 
Court at E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-02635.  Her later filings and the District Court’s orders 
were docketed in E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-04343. 
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Beeghley’s claim for certain pre-petition alimony arrears and disallowed the remainder of 
her claim, which included a claim to Mr. Beeghley’s retirement funds.  The Bankruptcy 
Court confirmed the Chapter 13 Plan.  Ms. Beeghley’s numerous filings resulted in an 
order, entered October 9, 1998, precluding her from future filings absent Court 
permission.  The Bankruptcy Court issued an order discharging the Beeghleys in 2001. 
 Shortly after the Bankruptcy Court barred Ms. Beeghley from filing documents 
without permission, she filed a motion for relief in District Court and other motions 
related to the Beeghleys’ assets.  The District Court docket reflects that on April 28, 
1999, the District Court denied eleven motions as frivolous and barred by collateral 
estoppel and res judicata.  The District Court also enjoined Ms. Beeghley from filing 
papers or initiating future actions without the Court’s permission.   
 On appeal, we vacated the filing injunction because it was overbroad and issued 
without adequate notice.  We also stated that Ms. Beeghley had appealed “the 
confirmation of the bankruptcy plan insofar as it purports to discharge her interest in the 
retirement funds.”  Beeghley v. Beeghley, 29 F. App’x 907, 909 (3d Cir. 2002) (non-
precedential).2  We stated that the District Court had not ruled on this claim and we  
remanded the matter to the District Court to address the sanctions anew and “to rule on 
the merits of the retirement fund dischargeability question.”  Id.   
 The District Court docket reflects that, on remand, the District Court held a 
conference in June 2002.  Two and a half years later, on December 16, 2004, the parties 
                                              
2We noted that Ms. Beeghley had filed appeals of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders and that 
these appeals were either dismissed or consolidated with the appeal before us. 
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were notified pursuant to the Court’s local rules that the action shall be dismissed for lack 
of docket activity, unless the court upon written application orders otherwise.  There were 
no docket entries until 2015, when documents related to Ms. Beeghley’s appeal of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s present order were entered.  See E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 98-cv-05527. 
 On June 30, 2005, Ms. Beeghley registered her divorce in Pennsylvania state 
court.  In 2011, she filed documents (which apparently were not served) purporting to 
preserve a claim to Mr. Beeghley’s retirement assets.  On October 1, 2014, Ms. Beeghley 
filed a motion seeking damages from Mr. Beeghley for violating the Delaware Family 
Court’s 1995 order and for failing to prepare the QDROs.  Mr. Beeghley and his wife 
moved to reopen their bankruptcy case in order to hold Ms. Beeghley in contempt for 
violating the 2001 bankruptcy discharge injunction by pursuing claims that she knew had 
been discharged or paid.  Ms. Beeghley responded that she could pursue the QDROs in 
state court based on, among other things, our 2002 decision and the Bankruptcy Court’s 
instructions. 
 After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that Ms. Beeghley violated the 
discharge order by attempting to re-litigate issues that are barred by res judicata.  The 
Bankruptcy Court explained that it had disallowed all but a small portion of the  
claim that Ms. Beeghley had filed in the bankruptcy case, that the District  
Court had dismissed her related appeal, and that the matter we remanded to District Court 
renewing her claim to the retirement assets was dismissed for inactivity.  The Bankruptcy 
Court also ruled that it would reach the same result under the doctrine of laches, as Ms. 
Beeghley was not diligent in filing her present motion and the Beeghleys are prejudiced 
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by the delay.  The Bankruptcy Court enjoined Ms. Beeghley from prosecuting the state 
court action or any other action to the same end. 
 On appeal in District Court, Ms. Beeghley argued in a motion to vacate the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order that the Bankruptcy Court had erred in light of this Court’s 
remand order and the fact that the notice of dismissal of her District Court action for 
inactivity provided for a dismissal “without prejudice.”  The District Court denied the 
motion.  The District Court stated that its local rules provide for a dismissal with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute, that when a case is dismissed without prejudice it is 
usually because the statute of limitations has not run, and that, even if the case was 
dismissed without prejudice, enough time had passed so that the dismissal would have the 
same effect as one with prejudice.  The District Court noted that laches would mandate 
the same result.  The District Court also denied Ms. Beeghley’s subsequent motion, 
which in substance sought reconsideration.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision.  In re Montgomery Ward, LLC, 634 F.3d 732, 736 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011).  We 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear error, apply plenary review to its 
conclusions of law, and review its exercise of discretion for abuse thereof.  Id; In re Ben 
Franklin Hotel Assoc., 186 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 Ms. Beeghley’s arguments on appeal are difficult to discern.  She primarily 
contends that the Delaware Family Court’s November 7, 1995 order constitutes a QDRO, 
and that the Beeghleys’ bankruptcy petition filed thereafter could not affect that order.  
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She also argues that the bankruptcy petition could not affect her interest in the retirement 
assets, which arose from the November 7, 1995 order.  These arguments are not properly 
before us because they were not raised in Bankruptcy Court and/or in the District Court 
on appeal.  See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2009); 
In re Kaiser Group Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 Ms. Beeghley also contends that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the retirement funds in the bankruptcy case, but subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be challenged after entry of a final judgment.  In re Diet Drugs, 582 
F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2009).  The bankruptcy case was reopened for the limited purpose 
of addressing the Beeghleys’ motion to enforce the discharge order.  The Bankruptcy 
Court’s orders, including its order as to Ms. Beeghley’s proof of claim, are final.   
 Ms. Beeghley also reiterates her argument that her prior District Court action was 
dismissed without prejudice in 2004.  Even if we were to conclude that this dismissal 
does not have preclusive effect, Ms. Beeghley has not shown that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in ruling that she violated the discharge order by pursuing a claim that she does not 
dispute was disallowed, and where further litigation as to the claim is barred by laches. 
 As recognized by the Bankruptcy Court, the elements of laches are lack of 
diligence and resulting prejudice.  See E.E.O.C. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 
69, 80 (3d Cir. 1984).  The Delaware Family Court’s order was issued over 20 years ago 
and QDROs were not prepared as ordered.  Ms. Beeghley asserted a claim to the 
retirement funds in the Beeghleys’ 1997 bankruptcy case and raised an issue on appeal as 
to its discharge.  We remanded the matter to District Court in 2002 to address this issue, 
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but the matter was dismissed for inactivity in 2004.  Instead of resolving this question, 
close to ten years later Ms. Beeghley filed a motion in Pennsylvania state court renewing 
her claim to the retirement funds by seeking damages for Mr. Beeghley’s alleged failure 
to prepare the QDROs.  Ms. Beeghley’s conduct reflects a lack of diligence, which she 
did not adequately explain at the hearing below. 
 The Bankruptcy Court also found that the Beeghleys are prejudiced by the delay 
based on accounting issues that it concluded would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
resolve at this late date.  The Bankruptcy Court stated, and the record reflects, that the 
Family Court’s November 7, 1995 order provided for the division of a retirement plan 
that had previously been terminated and where the assets had already been distributed.  
We find no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s finding of prejudice. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3
                                              
3Ms. Beeghley’s motion to dismiss the Beeghleys’ brief is denied.  Her motions to 
supplement and/or expand the record (as supplemented and amended) are granted to the 
extent the documents are of public record, denied as unnecessary to the extent the 
documents are included in the record below, and otherwise denied.  Ms. Beeghley’s letter 
motion, which may be construed as seeking leave to file an amended supplemental 
appendix, is denied as unnecessary. 
